Navy Special Operations ferry personnel detachments to relieve and resupply marines aboard the aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre, L.S.T. 57, at Second Thomas Shoal, or Ayungin, in the South China Sea on February 4, 2013. The ship, a former U.S. WWII vessel, was internationally grounded in 1999 to create a land claim to the shoal, and today, Marines stationed there year round guard the area from foreign occupation, particularly Chinese, who are aggressively seeking to control the entire South China Sea. (Photo by Ashley Gilbertson / VII Photo)

United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs-Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific hearing with respect to America’s Security Role in the South China Sea on July 23, 2015. A Senior Advisor and Senior Director of Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Dr. Patrick M. Cronin specified a ten fundamental components of a U.S. foreign policy to manage the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea)

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin

One of ten components Cronin prescribed American legislators is US “ought to count a menu of potential cost-imposition alternatives that rise above reputational and legitimate legal costs and make clear that bad behavior will incur a price.”

“In the event that China tries to prevent the resupply of the grounded Philippine maritime vessel BRP Sierra Madre at Ayungin Shoal, then the United States may offer to resupply it, as well as think about sending and deploying a few Marines on rotation as a major aspect of the crew’s training detachment,” he said.

Cronin likewise included in his ten essential components of US policy in managing West Philippine Sea the following: United States should regularly underscore our enduring principles; reinvest in our own long-term economic power; deepen diplomatic and practical support for ASEAN; build a maritime coalition ensuring the issue as top tier of regional diplomacy; maintain a constant presence; support an overlapping regional transparency regime; build national and multinational defensive and deterrent capacity; and seek to clarify types of behavior that would be objectionable.

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Note: Feature image shown for presentation purposes only.
Image credit to futurewarstories.
By: Jason E.

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